Introduction
The historiography on the SA, the Nazi stormtroopers, so far concentrated on the years 1921-1934 with the movement's 'years of struggle' in the late Weimar Republic and the brownshirts' violent contribution to the implementation of the Nazi dictatorship in 1933 and 1934. 1 By contrast, historians have explored only few aspects of the SA's history for the remaining eleven years of the Third Reich. 2 This is all the more true with regard to the extensive and often excellent research literature on the German expansionist policies in Central and Eastern Europe.
In these studies, Himmler and the SS take centre stage, whereas the SA is passed over in silence. 3 In a way, historians of National Socialism thereby remain loyal to a narrative that many former stormtroopers after the Second World War shaped for their own de-Nazification purposes and that was also given credibility by the trial of the major war criminals before the International
Military Tribunal (IMT) in Nuremberg in 1945/46. According to this narrative, the SA was without a doubt a leading Nazi organisation that had decisively contributed to the increase in political violence in the late Weimar Republic and had also exercised massive terror in the wake of the Nazi takeover of power in 1933 and 1934. By contrast, for the years that followed the stormtroopers are usually regarded as peripheral 'old fighters' who formed hardly more than a nostalgic drinking companionship. 4 However, from the perspective of someone who aims at contributing to a comprehensive
Gesellschaftsgeschichte of National Socialism, 5 the SA is an important organisation worth studying also for the years of consolidated Nazi rule. Despite the executions of Ernst Röhm and a considerable number of high-ranking SA leaders in the 'Night(s) of the Long Knives' between 30 June and 2 July 1934, to be followed by a wave of internal cleansing within the higher ranks of the stormtroopers, the SA remained an important National Socialist mass organisation with more than one million members in 1939. Under Röhm's successor Viktor Lutze, who remained at the helm of the SA until his death in 1943, the organisation consolidated and by the late 1930s even grew in importance again, not least a consequence of the ever more expansionist German 4 foreign policy and the radicalisation of the regime's antisemitic persecution. Whereas the relationship between the SA and the SS never recovered from the latter's 'stab in the back' in July 1934, a situation that only became worse with Himmler's SS taking control of the regular German police forces, the relationship with the Wehrmacht improved, culminating in the agreement from 19 January 1939 that attributed the SA sole responsibility in paramilitary affairs.
The SA was to organise the regular pre-and post-military trainings that, according to the regime's ambitions, were to play an integral part in German men's lives. Among NSDAP functionaries, support for the SA likewise remained strong-not only out of nostalgia, but increasingly also as a means to hold the ambitious SS in check. 6 In what follows, I will argue that the SA not only helped to stabilize the Nazi regime within the boundaries of the Reich, but that it also contributed to the German expansionist policies from the mid-1930s onwards. During these years, a major goal of the regime was to create new Lebensraum, or 'living space', for Germanic people, by engaging in vast geopolitical expansionist policies of de-and reterritorialization, that is the violent removing or enslavement of Jews and Slavs in the occupied territories of Eastern Europe and the following 'repopulation' of this allegedly empty space with people of Germanic origin. 7 A particular effort was made to win over Germans living abroad and to make these people, after the incorporation and annexation of borderland territories they partly inhabited, a genuine part of the nation. In this respect, a semantic shift is telling: Whereas Germans abroad until the early twentieth century were called Auslandsdeutsche, literally 'Germans living in foreign countries', the Nazis during the 1930s turned them into Volksdeutsche, or 'ethnic Germans'. 8 The SA felt called to actively engage in this process, not least because it seemed an opportunity to regain lost power within the patchwork of competing National Socialist organisations. From the second half of the 1930s onwards, the stormtroopers put forward their own ideas for the 'Germanization' of the European east-first with the aim to stimulate the settlement of SA men from the Old Reich into the newly occupied and annexed territories, above all in the Warthegau and in the General Government, and then by the establishing of new SA units there that were to consist predominantly of those 'ethnic Germans' who had previously settled beyond the borders of the Reich.
The following article is based on the available secondary literature as well as on printed primary and unpublished archival sources, in particular the extensive collection of SA files in the German Federal Archives. It is divided into four parts. Against the background of the recent historiographical debate about the nature and scope of the German Volksgemeinschaft, or 'people's community', I begin with outlining the fields of activities for SA stormtroopers and assess their importance for consolidating and upholding Nazi rule after 1934. 9 One political domain in which the SA was determined to play an important role was the National Socialist settlement movement. I will evaluate the SA's contribution to this movement in the 1930s that was originally concerned with the construction of new villages and city districts for the Party faithful. Such activities were part of 'inner colonialism', the population transfer within the existing borders of the German Reich in order to stimulate agriculture and economy in disadvantaged German regions, in particular in the northern and eastern provinces.
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The second part concentrates on the radicalised plans and initiatives of the so-called Glaubenstatt had two centres: the stadium with a tower that was to serve as a youth hostel, and a market square that was surrounded by an assembly hall, a school building and a home for the HJ. Yet, there was also a shooting range and an air-raid shelter. A track and field arena for paramilitary sports was planned, but probably never completed. 16 The conception of the 17 It did not only target men in the Old Reich, whom the Nazi propaganda continuously exposed to the idea that racially homogenous settlements had to be regarded as 'prerequisite for the fulfilment of the regime's economical, domestic and racial objectives', 18 but would later also reach out to ethnic Germans organised in the SA in the occupied territories. 19 Regional plans from 1937 aimed at the construction of not more than 2,500 settler's holdings nationwide, predominantly carried out as single-family homes. 20 Every house should consist of three or four rooms, covering at least sixty square meters, to be complemented by a large garden of 1000-1500 square meters at the inhabitant's disposal and intended mainly for the cultivation of vegetables and the breeding of small domestic animals. Unlike 'Glaubensstatt', which was built on former woodland, most of these modest settlements were so-called Stadtrandsiedlungen or 'suburban settlements', located in immediate vicinity to existing developments. Their parcels of land were much too small to allow for self-dependent agriculture. 21 Within these settlements, however, and contrary to the omnipresent ramblings of 'building a people's community', the authorities deliberately fostered social inequalities, for example by granting different sizes of land. The rationale of this unequal treatment was to intensify the competition among the new settlers, and to honour political and economic leadership. 22 According to a regulation from 1934, only male candidates who were either married or at least engaged were to be considered for such settlers' colonies, provided that they possessed the 'necessary good hereditary factors'. When the authorities realised that the comparatively small size of the houses did not correspond with the regime's propaganda for sexual reproduction, it slightly increased the housing space in these settlements so that families with many children could also be accommodated. 23 Overall, the authorities imagined the Nazi society in these settlements as competitive, racially pure and devoted to the Nazi project. The NSDAP heralded its settlement projects as proof of the fact that the party kept its social promises dating back to the years of the Great Depression. In reality, however, the number of 2,500 SA settlers' holdings was minimal, compared to the overall 22,000 settlements put in place between 1933 and 1939 and even more so to the 57,457 settlements that were created during the years of the Weimar Republic (1919) (1920) (1921) (1922) (1923) (1924) (1925) (1926) (1927) (1928) (1929) (1930) (1931) (1932) (1933) , among them 7,500 east of the river Elbe. 24 As early as 1931, the German Reich had started an ambitious small-settlement programme that attempted to provide new homes for workers on the outskirts of the larger towns. As politicians, social reformers and wealthy industrialists alike hoped, these settlements would provide the German worker with a renewed sense for the 'soil' [Scholle] and prepare at least some of them for farm work in the years to come. 25 The Nazis built on such earlier plans and initiatives, while at the same time claiming sole authorship for them. 26 Despite the limited extent of the Nazis' 'inner colonisation' attempts, they quickly turned into a 'preliminary stage' for much more ambitious colonisation projects abroad. 27 In contrast to the social realities, in particular the widening gap between the income of farmers and industrial workers in the Third Reich that did not help the popularity of agricultural labour, 28 Historical research so far has stressed that the inner colonisation movement in Nazi
Germany lost its importance with the establishment of the Wehrmacht in 1935. Not farmers, but soldiers were now called to protect the German borders. 32 However, I will demonstrate that these early NS settlement plans and projects remained politically important throughout the second half 1939, 45 Kasche insisted that an 'extensive involvement' on the part of the SA was by no means excluded and in fact highly desirable. Therefore, he urged his fellow-SA leaders to register even more potential farmers from the ranks of the SA with the aim of placing them in these new territories, despite 'all possible inhibitions and ties to their homelands'. 46 A circular from 8
December 1939 specified the next steps, indicating that the new SA settlements would initially be concentrated in those areas of Upper Silesia that were now integrated into the German Gau Silesia. Unlike the Warthegau and Danzig district, for that no detailed planning with regard to rural settlements existed yet, farmland in Silesia was released for 'immediate settlements', in cooperation with the governor of Silesia and the Schlesische Landgesellschaft based in Breslau.
Previously Polish owned farms, usually of the size of twenty acres, were to be expropriated.
Several of these small Polish estates should then be merged to create between 3,000 and 4,000
bigger farms with at least eigthy acres, the circular stated. If these figures were correct, this means that the number of farms in the previously Polish parts of Upper Silesia that the Germans expropriated after their military victory amounted to approximately 15,000. In contrast to the year 1938, the SA leadership now informed potential settlers that personal capital resources were no longer needed for the move eastwards: 'The farms will be handed over with inventory'. 47 However, a two-year-long probationary period during that the new German peasant had to demonstrate that he was in fact able to run such a farm should precede the final transfer of ownership. 48 As the majority of stormtroopers were meanwhile drafted into the Wehrmacht, the SA leadership repeatedly stressed that its men under arms would, in no way, suffer disadvantages because of their inability to obtain a placement immediately. The entire settlement area in Poland would be large enough to host all aspirants, during and also after the war. 49 Despite such assurances, isolated farmers from the ranks of the SA started to contact the Reichsnährstand directly to be considered as administrators on former Polish estates with the beginning of the war. That the SA was bypassed in these cases frustrated Kasche. He warned his 15 fellow stormtroopers that such incidents were exploited by the enemies of the SA as a proof of its organisational weakness. 50 Nevertheless, such problems continued. Two years later, in 1941, Kasche claimed to have contacted the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle in order to care for the approximately 700 SA men working for it. In the previous two years, the OSFA had no direct influence on these stormtroopers. 51 Despite these shortcomings, the surviving archival documents demonstrate that the SA persistently tried to secure a decisive influence in settlement matters, not the least in order to create a reliable powerbase for the SA's future growth. This was all the more important as the build-up of regular SA units in the newly occupied territories beginning in the autumn of 1939 took place in a chaotic way (if it happened at all). These new units were initially neither to be incorporated into the Reich SA, nor did the OSAF supply the SA groups bordering these new regions, in other words Ostmark, Ostland, Silesia and Sudeten, with additional financial means in order to expand their areas of operation. 52 In practical terms, the SA intended to be fully operational with at least 5,000 new SA settlers ready to move east immediately at the end of the war. In the meantime, the candidates were to be selected according to political and racial criteria in a joint effort of the SA with Such numbers and remarks put the aforementioned failure of the SA's recruitment attempts within their own rank-and-file in perspective. It was apparently not only the SA's inadequate organisation that was to blame for the relatively low numbers of applicants, but a much more deeply rooted problem: Despite the intense Nazi settlement propaganda prior to and 89 However, this did not imply that they were committed to implementing the National Socialist vision of a postwar 'German East' with a will of their own and presumably far-reaching personal consequences.
This holds true in particular for peasants, who were usually closely attached to their family's soil. Whereas many of those who actually moved east were young and unmarried, thus relatively open for change and excitement, the SA men targeted in the National Socialist propaganda were middle-aged husbands and family fathers, a group whose members in many cases had already decided on where to live, with whom, and how to sustain a living. For these men, the economic risk of possible failure loomed large, especially as many lacked the necessary financial and social capital to recover quickly in the event of losing their income and home.
This observation qualifies the assumption that the Nazi regime attempted to satisfy the expectations and demands of the German peasants by the acquisition of new 'living space' and new settlements there in the first place. 90 If one takes the actual behaviour of the German peasantry as a benchmark, it is obvious that only a small minority of farmers were willing to support the National Socialist settlement plans by indicating their willingness to permanently move into these areas. The actual implementation of the far-reaching SS settlements plans that, 
Eastern Europe
Farming in the occupied east seemed attractive only for a minority of Germans. As a consequence, resettlement experts like SS brigade leader Herbert Backe soon had to acknowledge that the 'new formation of German peasantry in occupied Europe' should be seen as a long-term project that would probably come to a close no earlier than long after the war. 93 Nevertheless, the SA Germanization policies mean more than a somehow obscure footnote in the history of National Socialism expansionism, mainly for two reasons:
Firstly, the SA's plans constituted-spatially and temporally-the connecting link between the Reichsnährstand's earlier 'inner colonization' projects and the later radical East. The Volksgemeinschaft was meanwhile understood as a Wehrgemeinschaft, with actual settlement initiatives postponed for peacetime. 100 Yet the concepts of racial superiority and the SA's alleged settlement mission continued to inspire its 'defence activities' against increasing 'partisan attacks' until the last phase of the Second World War. In the General Government, SA units were from 1944 onward regularly used for police tasks; 'completely armed' by the Nazi regime. 101 Similar to the development in the General Government, the SA-Gruppe Südmark in Slovenia since 1942 played a vital role in the 'securing' of Southern Styr and Carniola, an effort that included the persecution of both alleged and real partisans. In the annexed or occupied parts of the Greater German Reich, regional policing there went hand in hand with attempts to 'Germanise' those parts of the local populations deemed racially sufficient. 102 Whereas the actual settlement of stormtroopers in Eastern Europe failed with few exceptions, its concepts of race, discipline and the ability to self-defence on the occasion of its settlement initiatives contributed to the radicalisation of the people's community in the occupied territories.
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